Judicial Independence under Populist Pressure: A Socio-Legal Review of Democratic Backsliding in the Twenty-First Century

Abstract

Judicial independence is widely treated as a load-bearing pillar of constitutional democracy, yet in the last two decades this pillar has come under sustained pressure from elected populist governments across very different regions of the world. This review paper examines how populist actors in Hungary, Poland, India, Israel, Turkey, and the United States have used ordinary legal instruments, rather than open constitutional violation, to weaken courts from within. Drawing on the socio-legal literature on autocratic legalism, constitutional capture, and democratic backsliding, the paper argues that the erosion of judicial independence today is a slow, cumulative, and largely lawful process rather than a sudden coup. It proceeds through court-packing, jurisdiction-stripping, budgetary pressure, disciplinary control over judges, and a public rhetoric that frames courts as unelected obstacles to the popular will. The paper offers a comparative thematic analysis of these mechanisms, evaluates why existing constitutional safeguards have often failed to stop them, and closes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening structural and social resilience against future backsliding. The analysis is doctrinal and comparative, based on secondary academic literature, case law, and policy reports, and is intended as a contribution to socio-legal and comparative constitutional scholarship.